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The idea of the "developmental state" has proved one of the most robust, charismatic concepts in development theory. In the 1980's and 1990's, the concept played two roles in developmental debates. First, it provided a coherent counter to the dominant neo-liberal narrative that portrayed the market as the master institution underlying both growth and welfare. Second, it focused attention on the extraordinary success of economic transformation in the East Asia region. By the turn of the millennium the application of concept had spread beyond these origins, but it is still useful to recall its beginnings.
Chalmers Johnson (1982) deserves credit for having used the concept of the developmental state to explain Japan's rebirth from the ashes of World War II as an industrial power, but Korea and Taiwan, especially as portrayed in the influential work of Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) were the iconic cases. Korea and Taiwan were even more powerful cases for the transformative role of the state than Japan. Japan had been an imperial power with sufficient industrial capacity to undertake a world war before the period described by Johnson. Korea and Taiwan were former colonies with income levels below those of the more successful countries of Africa in the immediate post World War II period. When analysts like Amsden and Wade laid out connections between state structures and strategies and the ability of these countries to create globally competitive industrial sectors, the impact on developmental debates was fundamental (see the discussion in Lange introduction to this section, as well as Evans 1995).
We will not review these seminal formulations or the early history of the key cases on which they were based in any detail. Our aim instead is to focus on the more recent transformations of the developmental state. One task is updating understanding of original developmental states themselves by chronicling their historical transformation.
The classic characterizations of the development state in Korea and Taiwan are focused on the period from the mid-1960's through the mid-1980's. Any contemporary discussion of the developmental must take equal account of the evolution of these iconic cases from the 1980's to the present.
Even more important, however, is looking at the developmental state as a theoretical concept rather than as a description of a particular set of state apparatuses We will begin with by setting out the general theoretical approach to development that underlies our understanding of the developmental state. Its core is "Senian,"
emphasizing the essential role of expanding human capabilities, not just as the ultimate goal of development but also as an essential means for generating the increased productivity that is the foundation of economic growth (Sen, 1999) . We will then elaborate the implications of that perspective for re-conceptualizing the developmental state. The bureaucratic capacity of the developmental state looks even more important than classic analyses suggested. The analysis of the politics of the developmental state, however, requires serious revision. Rather than being a relatively simple politics of rational but authoritarian efforts to realize a national project of accumulation, the politics of the developmental state become the complex and often ambiguous politics of democratic deepening.
We flesh out this theoretical understanding of the developmental state by looking at three pairs of case studies. First, we will turn to the parallel evolution of the iconic developmental states during the last three decades -Korea and Taiwan. Then we will look at Brazil and South Africa -two major developing states that have been characterized as at least partial embodiments of the developmental state, but have taken divergent paths during the period under consideration. Finally, we will look at the two giants of the Global South -India and China. While neither of these two states has been traditionally considered a classic developmental state, they are key cases for any general understanding the connection between state structures, state-society relations and developmental outcomes. In the empirical analysis as in the theoretical discussion, our emphasis is on the political complexities of connecting the state to civil society in a way that enables a broad-based expansion of human capabilities.
Development Theory and the Developmental State
Understandings of the role of the developmental state have changed, first of all, because development theory has changed. Amartya Sen's (1999) Sen (1999,18) argues that "well-being" involves more than increasing contentment or reducing suffering;
it involves the capacity of human beings to do the things that they want to do. Thinking in terms of "capabilities" rather than just "well-being" draws our attention to the fact that human capabilities are both ends in themselves and the key means to intermediate goals, such as economic growth and the construction of democratic institutions that help us to "lead the kind of lives we value".
expands on the classic work of Barro and Lee (see Barro, 1997) Stephens (this volume) chronicle the effectiveness of the "social investment state" in Scandinavia at promoting growth built around a shift to knowledge-intensive production and high tech industries. Obviously, the specifics of the capabilities being fostered and the strategies of fostering them are quite different depending on the kind of production involved, but the connection between capability expansion and growth is robust across a wide range of economic contexts.
The shift to capability-centered theories of development also dovetails nicely with the resuscitation of classic concerns with the relation between inequality and development. As Huber and Stephens (2012) point out, there is a strong correlation between inequality and poverty and more specifically between educational inequality and lower overall educational attainment. A large literature confirms the destructive consequences of inequality for individual and community well-being, even in the most affluent societies (see Wilkinson 2005; Hacker 2006; Zuberi 2006 ). Cross national data shows a relation between lower levels of inequality and increased longevity. There is now a wealth of evidence that inequality can slow and even negate the poverty-reducing impact of growth and the World Bank now recognizes that inequality has perverse effects on institutions and undermines "good governance" (World Bank Development Report, 2006 services is one that must have both significant infrastructural power -the power to reach into society and deliver things -as well as significant authoritative power -the power to get individuals and groups to willingly obey commands.
Since more efficient administrative structures ultimately depend on new forms of embeddedness, state-society ties are inextricably linked to state capacity. The tradeoffs between different development projects are often acute in both social and material terms.
How social preferences are formed becomes key, and this in effect puts a premium on deliberation and coordination, two functions that require intensive engagement with those impacted by decisions. 6 Therefore, we argue that it is certain democratic forms of embeddedness -a concept we elaborate in more detail below -that are most likely to strengthen capability-enhancing state interventions.
Without multiple channels to source accurate information and continuous feedback loops that allow for policy-corrections, the developmental state will end up investing inefficiently and wasting precious public resources. The centrality of accurate information makes deliberative institutions key contributors to development as well as building blocks for democratic politics. While organizational and institutional forms will vary depending on the cultural and historical context, effective mechanisms of deliberation that include a broad cross-section of society is the foundation of effective public policy (Evans 2004 ).
The continuous monitoring and feedback of civil society sensors can radically reduce leakage and improve both the quality and quantity of delivery, especially for goods that can not be readily standardized (e.g. quality education, local planning). Active participation by citizens is in fact a key ingredient for many social policies. Education is co-produced by students (and their families). Health is "co-produced" by patients, their families and their communities (Ostrom 1996) . Environmental regulation is effective 6 This is what leads a long line of thinkers as diverse as Habermas (1996) , Sen (1999) and Rodrik (1997) to identify democratic deliberation as the meta-capability.
only when the state has allies in civil society capable of monitoring and exposing environmental problems. Indeed, following the line of reasoning developed in the new heterodox theories of industrial policy that point to the need for continuous experimentation, feedback and bootstrapping (Rodrik 2007; Sabel 1995) , it can be argued that intense state-civil society interactions are key to policy innovation (Baiocchi, Heller and Melo 2011) .
Effective state-society linkages depend on the organization of civil society as well as on the capacity of the state, but the state can help facilitate the organization of "civil society." The twentieth century developmental state's interaction with industrial elites gave these elites a reason to become a more collectively coherent class. The twenty-first century developmental state needs to undertake a similar but more difficult task:
constructing shared coherent goals whose concrete implementation can then be "coproduced" by public agencies and the communities themselves.
The importance of building engagement with a broad cross-section of civil society is increased by the contradictions between the increasingly globalized agenda of capital and a project of development as capability expansion. The old model of a shared national project of transformation uniting "national" capital and the state looks increasingly anachronistic. Even if the profit-maximizing strategies of capital were still nationally focused, the logic of private profit is harder to harness to capability expansion projects.
The large "collective goods" element in capability-expansion makes it harder to construct productive alliances with private capital. Social returns to the expansion of human capabilities are substantially higher than private returns, and firms are likely to channel investment to areas where total returns are lower but private returns appear higher.
Our basic general argument can be reiterated in simple terms:
1) Competent, coherent public bureaucracies are even more important than we thought they were. Without them, capability-expanding public services will not be effectively designed, say nothing of delivered.
2) The ability of the state to pursue collective goals, rather than responding to the subjectively defined, immediate, particularistic demands of elites, is even more essential than earlier work on the developmental state suggested.
3) "Embeddedness" -the dense sets of interactive ties that connect the apparatus of the state administratively and politically to civil society -not only becomes more important but must focus on a broad cross-section of civil society rather than focusing simply on industrial elites.
4) State effectiveness is not so much a technocratic problem as a political problem and state-society relations are at the heart of the politics involved.
In short, the transformation of the state requires re-directing analytical attention from technocratic politics that are either internal to the state or connect it to a restricted set of elite allies and focusing instead on how the state apparatus is connected to that analytically problematic set of actors referred to as "civil society."
The Politics of the Developmental State
The character of society is as central to the politics of state-society relations as the character of the state. Sadly, we must abandon the notion that there is a single, coherent and potentially efficacious historical subject that can act as the interlocutor of the developmental state -whether the working class or a national bourgeoisie -and admit that the state's most crucial interlocutor is in fact that most ambiguous and ambivalent of actors -"civil society." 7 While an ideal typical civil society is at the core of democratic politics, the associational life that is at the core of civil society is not inherently democratizing. Some associations are clearly uncivil, formed for the purposes of denying other groups their associational rights (e.g. Hindu-chauvinist groups in India, the KKK in the US). Whether civil society expands rights-based conceptions of democratic inclusion, serves and an extension of state hegemony (Burawoy 2003) or devolves into involutionary forms of retrenchment (Castells 2003 ) is an empirical question.
7 We define civil society as the full range of voluntary associations and movements that operate outside the market, the state and primary affiliations and that specifically orient themselves to shaping the public sphere. This would include social movements, unions, advocacy groups and autonomous NGOs and CBOs. From a sociological perspective, actors in civil society rely primarily on "social (as opposed to legal/bureaucratic or market) modes of mediation among people [organizing collective action] through language, norms, shared purposes, and agreements" (Warren 2001, 8) . This civic (Varshney 2002) or communicative (Habermas 1996 ) mode of action is as such distinct from the pursuit of political power, profits or the reproduction of primary ties and identities.
A strong civil society -one that is internally well organized and capable of autonomous action -can on balance be democratizing for two reasons. First, in an established civil society, one that is backed by the rule of law, the basis of legitimacy for all civil society groups is the pursuit of rights (Sommers 2008). Of course, rights can be expressed in exclusionary terms, but these are hard to defend as legitimate in the public sphere. Civil society in other words has a bias towards universalistic claims-making. 8 See also Tilly's argument that while some social movements often press particularistic claims, they nonetheless expand possibilities for subordinate claims: Social movements assert popular sovereignty… the stress on popular consent fundamentally challenges divine right to kingship, traditional inheritance of rule, warlord control and aristocratic predominance. Even in systems of representative government … social movements pose a crucial question: do sovereignty and its accumulated wisdom lie in the legislature or in the people it claims to represent? (2004:13).
To connect electoral representation to substantive outcomes subordinate groups must be able to meaningfully practice formal political rights and to leverage them to demand social rights. Much as Polanyi (1944) Focusing on "civil society" as the key interlocutor of a developmental state apparatus is less analytically comfortable than assuming that the state's societal counterpart is a unified political actor such as the working class or "national capital" but such a perspective is not without historical precedent. The developmental capacity of the European social democracies was founded on the strength of encompassing multi-class alliances. Solidaristic class politics did not emerge spontaneously, but were forged in the public spaces of bourgeois democracies, through a range of associations (from unions to book clubs) and through episodic periods of social mobilization. And many of the core ideas -both in terms of widely held norms and innovative social policies -that would eventually set the stage for social democracy had their origins in local government efforts to address labor-capital conflicts (Rothstein 1999 ).
The comparative literature on European welfare states establishes a fairly direct tie between developmental success and embeddedness: the degree, scope and encompassingness of working class mobilization is directly correlated with the size and depth of the welfare state, which is in turn directly correlated with more egalitarian economic and social outcomes (Huber and Stephens 2001) . Remarkably, the model has prospered in the post-industrial, knowledge-intensive economy: increased social investments, including advanced and flexible human capital formation and new forms of social support have enabled social democracies to successfully adapt to the competitive challenges of globalization (Huo and Stephens, this volume; Kristensen and Lilja 2012 
Empirical Variations in Development and State Transformation
In order to move from general arguments to more nuanced analysis of the political dynamics of the developmental state, we will examine three pairs of countries: 1) Korea and Taiwan: two archetypes of the twentieth century developmental state, which have evolved in parallel since their initial periods of industrial success and, for reasons still not fully understood, managed to deliver exceptional performance with regard to capability expansion in the neoliberal era. 2) South Africa and Brazil: two major middle-income developing countries that have experienced contrasting trajectories in terms of capability expansion over the course of the last two decades; 3) China and India: two giants of the Global South whose ambiguous trajectories with regard to capability expansion illustrate the complexities of the dynamics of the developmental state.
A. Korea and Taiwan as Capability Enhancing States:
The state capacities exhibited in Korea and Taiwan's successful industrial transformations have been well-specified.
The coherence and quality of the bureaucratic apparatus combined with the ability to create dense ties to industrial elites, made it possible for political elites to construct a transformative economic response to their geopolitical vulnerabilities. The centrality of capability expansion to the economic success of the East Asian tigers has, however, been relatively neglected. Even during their initial drives for industrial transformation, these states were pioneers in capability expansion, renowned for their levels of investment in human capital. They began their periods of accelerated economic growth with education levels that made them outliers for countries at their income levels and continued to invest in the expansion of education throughout the period of their rapid expansion.
If we refocus on these states in the last 30 years, the centrality of capability expansion to their development strategies becomes more explicit. As both Korea and 
B. South Africa and Brazil -Cases of Divergent Capability Performance:
Brazil and South Africa both democratized over the course of the last twenty to thirty years, overcoming historical legacies of extremely inegalitarian social structures and exceptionally high levels of economic inequality. Starting in the 1990's, newly-elected democratic political leadership in both countries shared the goal of remedying the injustices of historical inequality and expanding capabilities.
Despite their apparently similar political trajectories, South Africa and Brazil have diverged in terms of delivering well-being during recent decades of democratic rule.
Instead of growth bringing greater social disparities in Brazil, as it had under the military in the 1970's, it was "accompanied by rising average earnings, more formal employment, greater social protection for the population as a whole, greater equality in household income and wages, and a reduction in poverty" (Kerstenetsky 2009, 15) . "Bolsa Familia,"
Brazil's conditional transfer program, was small in terms of overall expenditures, but transformed the lives of tens of millions of poor Brazilians, almost a quarter of the entire population. Access to health care and education expanded as well.
In South Africa, investments in health and education have not delivered the same kind of returns. In Brazil, the rate of infant mortality was cut almost in half between 1996 and 2006. In South Africa, infant mortality increased in the same period. In Brazil, the proportion of girls in primary school rose from 83% to 95% between 1991 and 2004.
In South Africa, it dropped from 92% to 88% in the same period [see World Health
Organization, WHOSIS Database, http://www.who.int/whosis/en].
The divergence was even more dramatic in terms of levels of inequality. By the turn of the millennium, Brazil relinquished its 400 year old claim to being a world champion of inequality. Brazil's efforts at reducing its historic levels of inequality have begun to show up in the Gini Index. In addition, data shows a reduction of inequalities in very basic measures of human capabilities, such as child-stunting. Monteiro et.al. (2010) report significant reductions in the ratio of stunting in the bottom quintal of the income distribution as compared to the top quintile. They conclude (2010, 309), "The Brazilian experience is an example of the critical effect that policies to promote income redistribution and universal access to education, health, water supply, and sanitation services may have on child undernutrition." In South Africa, in contrast, the turn of the millennium saw a disturbing shift from historically high levels of inequality to levels that were even higher. Despite the fact that both countries have vibrant civil societies in which subordinate groups have organized and made claims on the state, the relation between political society and civil society is quite different. In South Africa, the broad-based civil society organizations that emerged from the anti-apartheid struggle have "become estranged from political society" and (Heller 2011a, 15) as an electorally dominant political party, the ANC, sought to extend its hegemony over popular organizations.
Participatory structures that were part of the architecture of South Africa's new democracy were dismantled or hollowed out after the ANC unilaterally embraced neoliberal reforms in 1996 and turned to a much more technocratic and managerialist strategy of delivery. Consequently, subaltern civil society has more or less been sidelined from the political process and the past few years have seen a dramatic rise in often violent "service-delivery protests" by the urban poor.
In contrast, in Brazil, a relatively autonomous civil society that can effectively engage the state through a range of participatory institutions has emerged, generating clear instances of civil society projecting itself into the state to shape policy as well as the institutionalization of a wide range of participatory structures and the strengthening of local democratic government (Heller 2011a, 27) . The "co-evolution" of party politics and civil society was the key to this process. Brazilian political parties at the time of democratization were notorious for being elite-dominated and ineffective (Baiocchi, Heller and Silva 2011) . It was social movements and a vibrant sector of activist NGOs that drew the state in by demanding participatory institutions of engagement and then projecting themselves into the state. The key agent of welfare expansion in the 2 nd phase of Brazil's social turn was a political party, the PT, but a political party that nonetheless 13 It is tempting to point to the devastating effects of AIDS in South Africa as a simple explanation for the divergence. The divergent trajectory of AIDS in the two countries is, however, endogenous to differences in political institutions. without "structural reforms that re-invent the welfare state on foundations that can be generalized to the vast majority of the population, the economic and social performance of the South African state will continue to deteriorate". They then go on to connect the failure to move in this direction to the failure to challenge the political hegemony of the current alliance of national and global capitalists.
The current global boom in demand for natural resources has the potential to "provide natural-resource-rich South Africa with significant opportunities to generate jobs, incomes, and taxable surpluses, as well as preferential market arrangements." (Arrighi, Ashcroft and Scully 2010, 434) . If appropriated and effectively invested in capability expansion by the state rather than left in the hands of capital, these revenues could "be used to promote and generate activities capable of re-inventing the welfare state on foundations that can be generalized to the vast majority of the population".
What has happened instead, Arrighi and his collaborators, argue is that the South African state ended up "betting on capital," focusing its demands on "Black Economic Empowerment," which meant making the capitalist elite more multi-racial, rather than claiming a larger share of the windfall profits from the resource boom. Thereby, the state (2010, 435) "forfeited the kind of investments in the welfare of the population (housing, public transport, health and, above all, mass lower and higher education) that would have been key developmental objectives in themselves and may well be the most essential, though by no means sufficient, condition of renewed economic expansion." While it built ties to capital, the state failed to enable civil society to engage in the "coproduction" of capability expansion.
C. India and China: Two Developing Giants
In the post World War II era China and India looked like the obvious contrast to the East Asian Tigers. In India, the Nehruvian state had bureaucratic capacity, but its transformative ambitions were stymied by "a regime of clientelist machine politics, fostered by a flabby and heterogeneous dominant coalition preoccupied with an anarchical grabbing of public resources … " (Bardhan 1983, 221 ). China's egalitarian socialist model enabled massive, broadly distributed investment in health and education but there was no capitalist class to ally with at all. Over the course of four decades, China has become the epitome of economic dynamism and India is a close second. Yet, in recent decades as the original East Asian tigers have moved in the direction of capability expansion, China and India are seen by at least some analysts as incapable of delivering the capability expansion that helped provide the foundations of their current growth.
Certainly these are telling trajectories from the point of view of any theory of the developmental state. We will start with China.
Few would deny the central role of China's creation of an educated populace with extended life spans in creating the foundation for its economic competitiveness in the last two decades of the 20 th century. Hart (2002) contrasts the success of this more capability oriented Chinese approach to the economic costs of South Africa's neglect of
capabilities. Yet, Drèze and Sen (2002) argue that just as China began to reap growth returns from its earlier investments in human development, its performance in terms of capability expansion began to falter.
One interpretation of this reversal can only be explained by highlighting the particular nature of the Chinese state's broad-based but authoritarian embeddedness. In the aftermath of a peasant revolution, embeddedness was secured through authoritarian structures, and particularly through the organizational prowess of a highly disciplined mass-based party that could reach into villages and factory floors to deliver results. But if this form of top-down command and control power was good at universalizing access to basic capabilities, in the absence of democratic checks and balances it lacked feedback mechanisms. This is how Drèze and Sen (1989) explain the paradox that a high capacity state could preside over the Great Famine that took the lives of millions even as local party authorities kept reporting bumper crops.
While China's overall levels of performance in terms of standard measures of capability expansion remains enviable, the rhythm of improvement in provision of key collective goods has slowed down with the transition to a more market-oriented approach, as Drèze and Sen's data on China's lagging performance relative to Korea with regard to reducing infant mortality in the 1990's illustrates (see discussion above).
Bardhan argues that much of the poverty reduction in China took place before foreign trade and investment began to drive growth in the 1990s. New data from the World Bank in fact shows that poverty reduction in China was mainly due to agricultural growth, which itself was tied to huge infrastructural and social investments in the socialist period (Bardhan 2010, 93-94) . In areas like health care, where a poor China delivered a level of health performance that was extraordinary for a country at its level of income, current performance has become a source of concern (see for example, Wang, 2004) . Chinese society has also suffered from sharply-rising income inequality and a withdrawal of prior social protections (see Davis and Wang, 2009 ). Economically successful "communist capitalism" has erased China's exceptionally low levels of inequality and contributed relatively little to the high levels of social protection that had characterized China in the socialist period.
During the "communist capitalism" period, as a combination of foreign corporations and local private capitalist elite groups gained increasing access to the party and the state at the national level and at the local level in the most economically dynamic regions of the country. As a corollary of this political shift, the state (and the Party) increasingly withdrew from its traditional role of directly providing welfare. State-owned industries stopped providing workers with social benefits (danwei) and land privatization in rural areas undermined the basis of the local welfare state. As the party-state withdrew, access to housing, education and health has increasingly became dependent on the market.
Will the Chinese state shift in the direction of greater emphasis on capability expansion in the absence of democratic pressures of the type that prompted this shift in Korea and Taiwan? Hu Jintao's recent emphasis on the "harmonious society," the 2008
Labor Law and an apparent increase in tolerance for strikes, various efforts to reinvigorate public efforts to provide health care and a gradual shift of the state budget toward giving "social and educational expenditures" a greater share all point toward more support for capability expansion. 14 At the same, time the continuing dispossession of the Chinese peasantry by urban land developers creates a powerful structural movement toward greater inequality and the refusal to tolerate organized challenges from civil society also makes it hard to believe that a real shift is underway.
The case of India provides further evidence of how a lack of broad-based embeddedness can undermine the capacity of a state to translate growth into capabilities, albeit under democratic conditions. Over the past two decades, the Indian state has largely failed to translate the dividend of two decades of rapid growth into higher levels of social provisioning. New Delhi has embraced policies that are aimed at capabilityexpansion but delivery continues to be highly top-down, more or less monopolized by the "bureaucratic-politician nexus" and subject to massive leakage.
Historically, the Gini coefficient for India has been comparatively low, but it is climbing and by some estimates has now surpassed China (Bardhan 2010, 97) . But other indicators leave little doubt that there is a disconnect between dynamic growth and capability expansion. Thus, despite very significant increases in educational spending and a now near-universal rate of primary school enrollment, teacher absenteeism remains chronic, caste discrimination rampant and school failure endemic (Ramachandran 2009 ). Nadu and Himachel Pradesh, while drawing on the same resources, institutional forms and bureaucratic structures of other states, suggests that the problem is more political -(the chain of sovereignty) than organizational (the chain of command) (Heller, 2011b) .
The Indian state, and in particular the subnational and local state are deeply embedded in society but only through linkages of party representation. And party representation in India has become highly fragmented and highly particularistic, reducing the state to a patronage machine (Chandra 2007) . Party politics have such an exclusive hold on how the state engages with society that civil society, in a pattern that resembles South Africa, has been almost entirely shut out (Heller 2009 ). The Indian state as such has few sensors, no effective feedback mechanisms and no co-producers. It can deliver on macro-economic policy and some mega projects, but it can't get teachers to teach, nurses to show up or municipalities to make their budgets transparent.
The counterfactuals are instructive. The dramatic progress in social development in the Southern states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu can be tied directly to their historical patterns of social mobilization. Broad-based anti-caste movements produced enduring encompassing political formations that not only strengthened the demand-side dynamic of civil society, but also created more competitive, redistributive party politics (Heller 2000; Harriss 2003; Ahuja 2010) .
Our comparison of China and India brings more nuance to our understanding of the relationship between the capability-enhancing state and growth, and how forms of state embeddedness mediate that relationship. In the pre-market period, the Chinese state was deeply embedded through authoritarian structures in society. This form of embeddedness facilitated rapid capability expansion and helped set the stage for China's dramatic economic take-off. Bardhan (2010) explicitly ties China's greater success in promoting capabilities and its more broad-based and diversified pattern of growth to the fact that China has much stronger and more developmental forms of local government (in our terms the greater institutional embeddedness of the state). But in the absence of democratic checks, there has been little to stop an increasingly business-oriented Party from pursuing growth at the expense of its traditional involvement in expanding capabilities.
India has also failed to capitalize on its growth dividend and inequality is also growing, significantly so in income terms but even more dramatically in human capability terms. In part, the state is increasingly constrained by its determination to promote accumulation. Kohli (2012, 213) concludes that "the narrowness of the ruling coalition helps explain both the forces that have accelerated growth in India and the disproportionate distribution of the fruits of that growth". In India's noisy and increasingly mobilized democracy however, the imperative to facilitate accumulation has to be balanced by the need for legitimacy. Thus the Centre has recognized the need to enhance capabilities and has made significant efforts to tackle India's massive deficits in service delivery. 15 But electoral imperatives in the absence of embeddedness undermine the state's developmental efficacy. In the absence of effective systems for delivery and local accountability, coordination remains poor and the rate of capture remains high. In urban areas, where much of the recent growth has been concentrated, efforts to develop urban infrastructure and social services have been stymied by the dominance of "landgrab" politics, as developers and politicians collude in capturing the rents of exploding urban land prices. Drèze and Sen (2011, 9) note that celebrations of India's growth have to be tempered by the recognition that "[t]he growing influence of corporate interests on public policy and democratic institutions does not particularly facilitate the reorientation of policy priorities towards the needs of the unprivileged." They go on to point out that in contrast to Brazil where public expenditures accounts for more that half of health 15 It is notable that many of these new initiatives have been in part driven organized NGOs and expertactivists (such as Jean Drèze) and have included new laws on right-to-information, an ambitious new rural poverty-reduction scheme and food security legislation. But such engagements remain the exception, and in any event fall short of providing the continuous input and vigilance that co-production requires.
expenditure and has resulted in the universalization of access to primary care, in India public monies account for less than a quarter of health expenditure and that with the growing influence of commercial insurance companies the prospect of building a public health care system are not very good.
Counterfactual cases within India suggest that the problem lies less in issue of state capacity, than with the way in which the state's relationship to society is constrained by political dynamics. State interventions continue to be captive to narrow, patronagedriven political imperatives that are highly entrenched at the sub-national and local level.
In the absence of countervailing civil society organizations that can hold bureaucrats and politicians to account and more broad-based forms of demand-making that would favor the provisioning of public goods, the prospects for successful capability-expansion in India remain limited.
In both India and China, the state has failed to fully translate growth into capability expansion. In China, this is a story of broad-based but authoritarian embeddedness that has narrowed without being replaced by a complementary democratic accountability to civil society. In India, a state that was democratically accountable, but narrowly embedded, has failed to develop even the most basic capabilities. In both cases, the limits of the state's accountability and responsiveness to subordinate groups are directly related to its increased ties to economic elites. The increasing political power of capital works in different ways in these two very different polities, but in both cases it works to undermine the engagement with civil society on which the effective production and delivery of collective goods depends.
CONCLUSION:
The conceptual analysis with which we began was premised on a sea change in development theory over the course of the last 25 years, one that has undercut the traditional preeminence of capital accumulation in favor of a perspective in which the expansion of human capabilities is both the ultimate goal and primary means of development. When applied to the developmental state, this perspective led to the argument that if the developmental state is to play an effective role in promoting development as capability expansion the key lies in transforming state-society relations.
Our three paired comparisons of country cases reinforced the analytical argument.
They revealed just how important the state is in organizing the relationship between a capitalist economy and capability-enhancing development. Because markets necessarily under supply public goods, the state plays a critical role in ensuring that growth can be translated into capability enhancement, and that capability enhancement and social investment more generally can in turn promote growth.
Promoting capabilities in the contemporary global capitalist economy requires broad-based embeddedness. In its optimal form, such embeddedness implies three things: links to a plurality of groups; multiple points of contact with the state that reduce the costs of transaction between state and society; modes of intermediation that promote co-production and coordination over domination, coercion or dependency.
In our paired studies, we have highlighted two sources of differences in the nature of embeddedness. The first has to do with how broad the state's engagement is with society. States can be linked to select groups, or they can be articulated with more a more encompassing set of social actors and interests. If 20 th century theories of the social democratic state located the source of more "encompassing" embeddedness in the formation of the working class, revisionist accounts and our interpretation of 21 st century cases suggest the importance of developing more nuanced understandings of the conditions under which civil society can produce solidaristic politics. The second has to do with how that form of engagement is mediated. It can take an authoritarian form in which the state enjoys despotic power, or it can take a democratic form in which the state must negotiate the terms of its intervention with civil society. The authoritarian form can be expedient, but in the absence of countervailing forces it can be subject to the problems that Scott identified in his critique of high modernism. Authoritarian embeddedness limits the effective functioning of the development state by short-circuiting the flow of information, disincentivizing cooperation and precluding the type of institutional finetuning that is so critical to building effective forms of intervention. Our argument thus reaffirms Mann's (1986) classic finding that states whose power is democratically authorized have been much more successful in the long run in developing synergistic relations with society than authoritarian states.
Representative institutions by themselves cannot ensure that the state's engagement with society produces developmental outcomes. A competitive party system is critical to countering the problem of elite capture. But, as the case of India underscores, even in a highly consolidated and extremely competitive electoral system, representative mechanisms can still fail to secure accountability to citizens. Electoral calculations in a majoritarian system in a diverse society can favor the logic of clientelism over the logic of public provisioning. Movement toward a more universalistic logic requires civil society organizations with a capacity for engagement and political intermediation by parties able to avoid "embedded particularism" (Herring 1999) .
From our six cases we can identify three configurations of embeddedness. Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea have all achieved a form of democratic embeddedness. Though the developmental state has actively pursued market reforms and helped build economic dynamism, it has also supported capability expansion. Though the pattern of democratization itself varied significantly, in all three cases this helped create the political support for extending social services.
We lack the same depth and variety of research on the role of civil society in Taiwan and South Korea, but some preliminary propositions are still possible. There is consensus that a combination of a cross-class anti-authoritarian alliance and working class mobilization drove democratization in South Korea. Conversely, the emergence of electoral competition was fundamental in expanding the political space in which civil society organization could engage the state. Nonetheless, it is also seems clear that an increasingly active role of civil society has been critical to promoting social reforms in both countries, especially when compared with the relative quiescence of political parties themselves on social issues.
South Africa stands as a cautionary tale. Because of the anti-apartheid struggle, democratic south Africa inherited a vibrant and organized civil society, one in which rights-based discourses were powerful and subordinate groups enjoyed significant capacity for collective action. South Africa might very well have travelled the same path as Brazil, except that the dominant party status of the ANC has more or less insulated the state from subordinate civil society. In the absence of feedback mechanisms and countervailing democratic power, state power has increasingly tended towards a form of high modernism. This has produced both policy disasters, such as the refusal by the Mbeki administration to address the HIV-AIDs pandemic, as well as a more general policy drift that has favored capital over capability-expansion.
The ambiguous cases of India and China underline both the different dynamics associated with different kinds of state society relations and the continuing importance of the state's autonomy in relation to the agendas of capitalist elites. While it is possible to imagine paths from either India's democratically accountable, but narrowly embedded state or China's broad-based but authoritarian embeddedness to a more deeply democratic embeddedness that would be consistent with the effective promotion of capability expansion, it is even easier to envisage negative trajectories. These cases make it clear that there is no functionalist logic that insures the positive transformation of the developmental state.
In all three pairs of cases, as in the conceptual analysis that preceded them, politics are primary. Technocratic and organizational capacities are still fundamental to the success of the developmental state, but absent a complementary politics of encompassing engagement with a broad cross-section of society, technocratic capacity is sterile and ineffectual. In building a politics of capability expansion the state itself cannot be the only actor, nor can it rely only on elite allies. Absent an effective conglomerate of societal actors capable of embodying the roles intrinsic to "civil society"
as an ideal type, the developmental state cannot deliver capability expansion. A continuous process of transformation in response to the challenges of development is the primary feature of states that succeed in remaining persistently developmental.
